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k -Anonymity in the Presence of External
Databases
Dimitris Sacharidis, Kyriakos Mouratidis, and Dimitris Papadias
Abstract—The concept of k-anonymity has received considerable attention due to the need of several organizations to release
microdata without revealing the identity of individuals. Although all previous k-anonymity techniques assume the existence of a
public database (PD) that can be used to breach privacy, none utilizes PD during the anonymization process. Specifically, existing
generalization algorithms create anonymous tables using only the microdata table (MT ) to be published, independently of the external
knowledge available. This omission leads to high information loss. Motivated by this observation we first introduce the concept of k-
join-anonymity (KJA), which permits more effective generalization to reduce the information loss. Briefly, KJA anonymizes a superset
of MT , which includes selected records from PD. We propose two methodologies for adapting k-anonymity algorithms to their KJA
counterparts. The first generalizes the combination of MT and PD, under the constraint that each group should contain at least one
tuple of MT (otherwise, the group is useless and discarded). The second anonymizes MT , and then refines the resulting groups
using PD. Finally, we evaluate the effectiveness of our contributions with an extensive experimental evaluation using real and synthetic
datasets.
Index Terms—Privacy, k-anonymity.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
NUMEROUS organizations (e.g., medical authorities,government agencies) need to release person-
specific data, often called microdata. Although micro-
data are useful for several tasks (e.g., public health re-
search, demographic analysis), they may unintentionally
disclose private information about individuals. Privacy
preservation aims at limiting the risk of linking published
data to a particular person. Three types of microdata at-
tributes are relevant to privacy preservation: (i) identifiers
(IDs), (ii) quasi-identifiers (QIs), and (iii) sensitive attributes
(SAs). IDs (e.g., passport number, social security number,
name) can be used individually to identify a tuple.
Clearly, the IDs of all microdata tuples should always be
removed in order to protect privacy. QIs (e.g., zipcode,
gender, birth date) are attributes that can be combined to
act as IDs in the presence of external knowledge. Finally,
SAs (e.g., disease, salary, criminal offence) are fields that
should be hidden so that they cannot be associated
to specific persons. The process of conceiling identity
information in microdata is called de-identification. On the
other hand, re-identification is the successful linking of a
published tuple to an existing person and corresponds
to a privacy breach.
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In a well-known example, Sweeney [1] was able to
determine the medical record of the governor of Mas-
sachusetts by joining de-identified patients’ data with a
voter registration list. Figure 1 illustrates a simple re-
identification case. The microdata table MT has two
numeric QIs and a categorical SA. A public database PD
contains information about the persons of MT except
for D. Moreover, it includes 6 additional records: G1,
G2 (which have identical QI values to G), U , V , X , Y .
The tuples A, B, C, E, F of MT can be re-identified
since their QI value combinations are unique in PD. For
instance, by performing an equi-join MT 1QI1,QI2 PD,
one can infer that the SA of A is v1. On the other hand,
G cannot be uniquely re-identified since there are three
records in PD with identical QI values.
1 1
2 2
1 4
3 1
3 2
5 4
MT
SA
v1
ID
A 1 1
B 2 2
C 1 4
E 3 1
F 3 2
G 5 4
G1 5 4
G2 5 4
X 3 4
Y 4 1
PD
2 3
ID
U 1 2
V 2 4
D
tuple
QI1 QI2 QI1 QI2 QI1 QI2
v2
v1
v2
v1
v2
v3
Fig. 1. Microdata (MT ) and Public Database (PD)
Several concepts have been proposed to achieve pri-
vacy preservation. Most database literature has focused
on k-anonymity [1], [2]. Specifically, a table T is k-
anonymous if each record is indistinguishable from at
least k − 1 other tuples in T with respect to the QI
set. For instance, MT in Figure 1 is 1-anonymous as
all combinations of QI values are distinct. The process
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of generating a k-anonymous table given the original
microdata is called k-anonymization. The most common
form of k-anonymization is generalization, which involves
replacing specific QI values with more general ones.
The output of generalization is an anonymized table AT
containing anonymized groups, each including at least k
tuples with identical QI values. AT in Figure 2(a) is a
3-anonymous version of MT . A tuple (e.g., A) is indis-
tinguishable among the other records (B, C, D) in its
group with respect to the QI attributes, and therefore, its
record in MT cannot be precisely determined. Because k-
anonymity focuses exclusively on QIs, we omit SA from
our illustrations. On the other hand, although the ID is
not actually included in MT , we show it in the diagrams
for easy reference to the tuples.
ID
A 1 1
B 2 2
C 1 4
E 3 1
F 3 2
G 5 4
MT AT
D 2 3
1-41-2
1-41-2
1-41-2
1-41-2
1-43-5
1-43-5
1-43-5
QI1 QI2 QI1 QI2
(a) MT and AT
1 2 3 4 5
1
2
3
4
QI1
QI2
A
B
g1
D
E
F
GC
g2
(b) 2D representation
Fig. 2. Generalization based exclusively on MT
Figure 2(b) contains a visualization of AT , where each
group is represented by a rectangle enclosing the QI
values of all tuples in the group. Since generalization
replaces specific values with ranges, it incurs some in-
evitable information loss, which can be measured based
on various metrics. In general, the usefulness of AT , as
well as the effectiveness of a generalization technique, is
inversely proportional to its information loss, provided
of course that k-anonymity is satisfied.
This work is motivated by the observation that al-
though all previous k-anonymity techniques assume the exis-
tence of a PD, which can be used to breach privacy, none actu-
ally takes PD into account during the anonymization process.
This omission leads to unnecessarily high information
loss. In Figure 1, if k = 3, tuple G ∈MT does not require
generalization, as PD already contains 2 other records
(G1 and G2) with the same QI values. Based on this
fact, we introduce the concept of k-join-anonymity (KJA)
to reduce the information loss. Briefly, KJA anonymizes
a superset of MT , which includes selected records from
PD.
KJA permits the utilization of existing generalization
techniques. Specifically, we propose two methodologies
for adapting a k-anonymity algorithm kAlgorithm to its
KJA counterpart. The first simply applies kAlgorithm
directly to the equijoin of MT and PD, under the con-
straint that each group should contain at least one tuple
of MT (otherwise, the group is useless and discarded).
The second executes kAlgorithm on MT and refines the
resulting groups using PD.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
surveys previous work on k-anonymity and related con-
cepts. Section 3 introduces k-join-anonymity. Section 4
describes the methodologies for adapting k-anonymity
generalization to KJA. Section 5 contains an extensive
experimental evaluation using real and synthetic data
sets. Section 6 concludes with directions for future work.
2 BACKGROUND
Section 2.1 introduces k-anonymity and Section 2.2 re-
views methods and relevant literature. Section 2.3 out-
lines other related privacy models.
2.1 Preliminaries
A microdata table MT contains tuples without ID values
that correspond to persons; we assume that only a single
tuple per person exists in MT . Note that only the QI
set1 is important for k-anonymity and the SAs can be
ignored. The individuals in MT are drawn from a large
population, termed universe.
Definition 1. The set of existing individuals that may
appear in MT is called the universe U of MT . The schema
of U consists of the unique identifier (ID) and all QI
attributes appearing in MT .
The notion of universe may encapsulate several re-
strictions on various aspects of the data, such as their
geographic and temporal scope. Consider, for instance,
a geriatric clinic in Massachusetts admitting individuals
above 50 years of age that wishes to release patients’
microdata. The universe consists of residents of Mas-
sachusetts with age attribute greater than 50. As another
example, consider a company that releases payroll in-
formation about employees who received a raise. In this
case, the universe contains all employees of the company.
Given MT , the anonymization process produces an
anonymized table (or view) AT that contains all tuples
and QI attributes, and preserves as much information as
possible compared to the original table MT .
Definition 2. A table AT is an anonymized instance of
MT if: (i) AT has the same QI attributes as MT , and
(ii) there is a one-to-one and onto mapping (bijection) of
MT to AT tuples.
The most common method, i.e., mapping, for achiev-
ing anonymization is generalization. For numerical QIs a
generalization of a value is a range. For categorical QIs
it is a higher-level value in a given hierarchy (e.g., a city
name is replaced with a state, or country). Since categor-
ical values can be trivially mapped to an integer domain,
we assume only numerical QIs here. A generalized AT
tuple is represented as an axis-parallel (hyper) rectangle,
called G-box, in the QI space defined by the extent of its
QI ranges. We use the term anonymized group, or simply
group, to refer to the set of MT tuples that fall within a
G-box. The goal of k-anonymity is to hide the identity of
1. [3] contains a formal definition of quasi-identifiers and an in-depth
study of their interpretation in different settings.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON KNOWLEDGE AND DATA ENGINEERING 3
individuals by constructing G-boxes that contain at least
k MT tuples.
Definition 3. An anonymized table AT of MT is k-
anonymous if the mapping of each MT record is indis-
tinguishable among the mappings of at least k− 1 other
MT tuples.
To understand the guarantees of k-anonymity we
must first specify the privacy threat and the adversarial
knowledge. We consider the re-identification attack [1],
where an attacker’s objective is to pinpoint the tuple of
a particular person, termed victim, in the anonymized
table. Adversarial knowledge is described in the follow-
ing.
Definition 4. The schema of a public database (PDa)
consists of the unique identifier (ID) and all QI attributes
appearing in MT .
Assumption 1 (Precondition). The attacker has access
to a public database PDa which contains at least the
victim’s tuple.
Using PDa, the attacker identifies the QI values of a
victim V and matches them in AT . The next theorem
defines the breach probability, i.e., the probability that an
attacker re-identifies the victim’s tuple.
Theorem 1. The breach probability for a victim V in a
k-anonymous table AT is pbr ≤ 1/k independent of the
attacker’s PDa.
Proof: The victim V falls inside at least one G-box g
in AT . Since AT is k-anonymous, g consists of |g| ≥ k
identical generalized MT tuples. Thus, pbr ≤ 1/|g| ≤
1/k.
Various metrics have been proposed to quantify the
information loss incurred by anonymization. According
to the discernability metric (DM) [4], each MT record
is assigned a penalty equal to the cardinality of its
anonymized group. The DM of AT is defined as the sum
of penalties of all MT tuples. According to the normalized
certainty penalty (NCP) [5], the information loss for a
record is equal to the perimeter of its G-box. The NCP
of the AT is defined as the sum of the information loss
for every MT record. For instance, the NCP of AT in
Figure 2 is 62; i.e., 8 · 4 for g1, and 10 · 3 for g2.
2.2 k-Anonymity Methods
There are various forms of generalization. In global re-
coding, a particular attribute value in a domain must
be mapped to the same range for all records. In local
recoding, different value mappings can be chosen across
different anonymized groups. The generalization process
can also be classified into single-dimensional, where map-
ping is performed for each attribute individually, and
multi-dimensional, which maps the Cartesian product of
multiple attributes.
Optimal algorithms for single-dimensional generaliza-
tion using global recoding appear in [4] and [6]. Mon-
drian [7] is a multi-dimensional, local recoding technique.
Xu et al. [5] propose TopDown, a local recoding method
based on clustering. Another anonymization technique
that uses clustering is proposed in [8]. Meyerson and
Williams [9] and Aggarwal et al. [10] present theoretical
results on the complexity of generalization. Aggarwal
[11] studies the effect of the number of QI attributes
on the information loss and concludes that k-anonymity
suffers from the curse of dimensionality.
In the sequel, we describe in detail the Mondrian and
TopDown generalization algorithms, which we adapt to
KJA in Section 4. Mondrian [7] constructs QI groups than
contain from k up to 2k − 1 tuples (when all QI values
present in MT are distinct), following a strategy similar
to the KD-tree space partitioning [12]. In particular,
starting with all MT records, it splits the d-dimensional
space (defined by the d QI attributes) into two partitions
of equal cardinality. The first split is performed along
the first dimension (i.e., quasi-identifier QI1), according
to the median QI1 value in MT . Each of the resulting
groups is further divided into two halves according to
the second dimension. Partitioning proceeds recursively,
choosing the splitting dimension in a round robin fash-
ion among QI attributes. Mondrian terminates when each
group contains fewer than 2k records. The resulting
space partition is the anonymous version of MT to be
published.
Figure 3 demonstrates 3-anonymization with Mon-
drian, assuming that MT contains records A, . . . ,M
and has two quasi-identifiers. The horizontal axis cor-
responds to QI1, and the vertical to QI2. The first split is
performed on the horizontal axis, according to the QI1
value of C. The left (right) half of the space contains 6 (7)
MT tuples (i.e., exceeding 2k − 1 = 5), and it is divided
into two groups according to the QI2 value of record A
(of record F ). Since each resulting group has fewer than
5 tuples, splitting terminates. The anonymized version
AT of MT consists of the four shaded minimum bound-
ing boxes (MBBs), each representing an anonymized
group.
 
G
I
B
H
J
ED
K
F
M
C
A
L
QI1
QI2
Fig. 3. Generalization of MT with Mondrian
TopDown [5] is a recursive clustering algorithm. Specif-
ically, it starts with the entire MT and it progres-
sively builds tighter clusters with fewer points. Figure 4
demonstrates the steps of TopDown on the MT tuples
of Figure 3. Initially, the algorithm finds the two tuples
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that if included in the same anonymized group, they
would result in the largest perimeter. In our example,
this first step retrieves G and E. Next, TopDown considers
the remaining records in random order, and groups
them together with either G or E; a considered tuple is
inserted to the group where it causes the smallest NCP
increase.
In Figure 4(a), assume that record A is processed first.
It is included in G’s cluster, because if grouped with
E it would lead to a rectangle with larger perimeter.
Similarly, if C (H) is the second tuple, it is grouped with
E (with G and A). After the first pass, all records belong
to either group. The procedure is repeated recursively
within each cluster, until all groups have no more than
k tuples. After this step, the majority of the groups have
cardinality below k. To fulfill the k-anonymity require-
ment, undersized groups are merged with neighboring
ones according to some heuristics, aiming at a small
NCP. The shaded MBBs of Figure 4(b) correspond to four
anonymized groups in our example.
 
G
C
E
A
QI1
grouped with G
grouped with E
H
grouped with G and A
QI2
(a) NCP-aware grouping
 
G
E
A
QI2
H
I
B
J
D
K
F
M
C
L
QI1
(b) Anonymized groups
Fig. 4. Generalization of MT with TopDown
2.3 Related Concepts
Although k-anonymity hides the tuple of an individual
among others, it fails to conceal its sensitive information.
For example, when all k tuples in the group of victim
V have the same disease, an attacker can determine V ’s
disease with 100% probability. For this reason, various
alternative anonymization methods were proposed. The
most widely used is l-diversity. A table is l-diverse if each
anonymized group contains at least l well-represented2
SA values [13]. Existing k-anonymity algorithms can
be extended to capture l-diversity. For instance, when
Mondrian splits a group, it has to ensure that each
partition satisfies l-diversity. Otherwise, it must abandon
the split (or choose another split axis). Xiao and Tao [14]
follow a different approach that publishes the original
QIs and SAs in different tables, so that l-diversity is
preserved without the need for generalization (however,
k-anonymity is fully compromised). A similar method
is used in [15] for improving the accuracy of aggregate
search. Two recent works study the re-publication of
2. There are different definitions of l-diversity depending on the
background knowledge available to the attacker.
data. In particular, Byun et al. [16] discuss preservation
of l-diversity when new tuples appear in the MT . Xiao
and Tao [17] also study deletions of MT tuples.
The concept of t-closeness [18] requires that the distri-
bution of SA values in each QI group is analogous to
the distribution of the entire dataset. Knowledge of the
inner mechanisms of the anonymization algorithm can
result in privacy breaches as shown in [19]. The authors
introduce the concept of m-confidentiality that prevents
such attacks. A broader, compared to l-diversity, model
for capturing background knowledge and the related
(c, k)-safety notion are discussed in [20]. Rastogi et al.
[21] present a theoretical study of the privacy-utility
tradeoff inherent in anonymization. Ghinita at al. [22]
propose fast algorithms for achieving k-anonymity and
l-diversity. The concept of km-anonymity [23] captures
the existence of multiple records per person in the
microdata.
Given a known universe U , the presence attack tries
to determine if an individual from U appears in the
microdata. For example, consider a penitentiary that
releases a list of its inmates. In this scenario, discovering
whether someone has been imprisoned constitutes a
privacy breach. Although k-anonymity can protect from
these attacks, it offers privacy guarantees that can vary
considerably among the MT tuples. On the other hand,
δ-presence [24] is designed to ensure uniform breach
probability for all individuals in MT .
3 k-JOIN-ANONYMITY
Section 3.1 formally introduces k-join-anonymity (KJA)
and presents the underlying assumptions. Section 3.2 ex-
tends KJA to handle sensitive attributes and Section 3.3
investigates the utility of the released data.
TABLE 1
Notation
Symbol Description
ID Identifier attribute
QI Quasi-identifier attribute
SA Sensitive attribute
MT Microdata table
MT+ MT augmented with the ID
U Universe
PDa Public database known to the attacker
PDp Public database known to the publisher
JT+ Full outer join table of MT+ with PDp
JT JT+ without the ID
AT k-anonymous table of MT
JAT k-join-anonymous table of MT
SI Auxiliary table containing the SA
3.1 Definitions and Assumptions
The goal of k-join-anonymity is to provide the same
privacy guarantees with k-anonymity incurring, how-
ever, less information loss. To achieve this it shrinks
the G-boxes using public knowledge about universe (U)
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tuples. In some applications, the entire U is available to
the publisher, e.g., as in the company payroll example.
However, in most practical cases, knowing every person
in the universe is not feasible.
Assumption 2. The publisher possesses a public
database PDp, which is a subset of the universe.
Note that PDp should contain at least the QI at-
tributes of MT . Extra attributes in PDp are discarded.
A PDp that does not include all QIs is useless for
KJA. The anonymization process uses information from
MT and PDp. Let JT+ denote the full outer join table
PDp 3ID MT
+, where MT+ corresponds to the mi-
crodata augmented with the ID attribute. JT refers to
the join table without the ID, and contains tuples that
appear (i) in both PDp and MT , (ii) in PDp but not in
MT , and (iii) in MT but not in PDp. The main difference
of KJA from previous k-anonymity formulations is that
an MT record may be anonymized/grouped with any
JT tuple, as opposed to being restricted to MT records.
Note that not all PDp tuples may be needed during
the anonymization process. On the other hand, all MT
records must be anonymized. We refer to a subset of JT ,
which contains all MT tuples, as proper.
Definition 5. A table JAT is a join-anonymized instance
of MT if: (i) JAT has the same QI attributes as MT , and
(ii) there is a one-to-one and onto mapping (bijection)
from a proper subset of JT to JAT tuples.
Similar to k-anonymity, KJA uses generalization as the
mapping function and enforces the following condition.
Definition 6. An anonymized table JAT of MT is k-
join-anonymous if the mapping of each MT record is
indistinguishable among the mappings of at least k − 1
other JT tuples.
When the publisher has no knowledge regarding ad-
ditional U tuples, i.e., PDp is empty, JT =MT and thus
KJA reduces to conventional k-anonymity.
Figure 5(a) illustrates a 3-join-anonymous table JAT
using the MT and PDp of Figure 1; Figure 5(b) visualizes
the resulting G-boxes. Comparing JAT with AT , note
that group g1 of AT (Figure 2(b)) is partitioned into two
smaller ones in JAT , g′1 and g′2, utilizing points U and
V . Similarly, group g2 shrinks to g′3 and g′4, using Y , G1
and G2.
Theorem 2. The breach probability for a victim V in a
k-join-anonymous table JAT is pbr ≤ 1/k independent
of the attacker’s PDa.
Proof: The victim V falls inside at least one G-box g
in JAT . Since JAT is k-join-anonymous, g contains |g| ≥
k identical generalized JT tuples (from either MT or
PDp). Given that the attacker cannot distinguish among
them, pbr ≤ 1/|g| ≤ 1/k.
We emphasize that KJA does not include artificial tuples
in the anonymization process. The reason is to protect from
presence attacks [24]. In this setting the attacker is aware of
the entire universe, PDa = U , but does not know which
QI1
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1-2
1-2
1-2
3-4
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3-4
3-4
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1-2
1-2
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1 2 3 4 5
1
2
3
4
QI1
QI2
A
B
C
E
F
G
Y
G1 G2
X
ignored
U
D
V
MT tuple PD tuple
g'2
g'1 g'3
g'4
(b) 2D representation
Fig. 5. Generalization in the presence of PD
individuals from U appear in the microdata. Her/his
goal is to collect information regarding the presence of
the victim V in MT . For example, consider an attacker
that wishes to find out if V has been hospitalized by
examining an MT containing patients’ records. If we
allow artificial tuples, it is possible that the publisher
anonymizes V to a group g using k − 1 non-U records.
Since the attacker knows the entire universe, s/he can
perform a successful presence attack, i.e., disqualify all
k−1 artificial tuples and ascertain that V appears in MT .
A similar breach happens when the attacker purposely
publishes a database with census data, among which
s/he includes fake tuples of non-existing individuals
or erroneous (i.e., purposely modified) information for
existing individuals. If this database is included in the
anonymization process, the adversary may subsequently
disqualify the known fake/erroneous tuples and de-
termine the presence of MT records anonymized with
them.
In order to satisfy Assumption 2 and prevent presence
attacks, the publisher must (i) incorporate into PDp
only databases published by trusted authorities (such as
government offices) and (ii) cross-check the accuracy of
PDp tuples from multiple external databases. To prevent
tampering with these data by third parties (e.g., adver-
saries gaining access to the trusted authorities’ databases
or interfering with the data transfer channel) the owner
of PDp may deploy authenticity verification methods
such as [25], [26].
3.2 Sensitive Information
When the microdata contain sensitive attributes, KJA
should protect from attribute disclosures [13] as well.
According to this attack model, the adversary wishes
to determine the sensitive information associated with
the victim. This section shows that KJA is equivalent to
traditional k-anonymity for preventing attribute disclo-
sure. Note that k-anonymity offers non-uniform breach
probability to tuples for this type of attack; in fact,
this observation was the motivation for the l-diversity
concept [13]. Furthermore, for a particular victim, differ-
ent k-anonymous tables may offer different guarantees.
Below we show that given a k-anonymous table AT , one
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can construct a k-join-anonymous JAT , such that AT
and JAT provide the same level of protection to each
tuple.
Since a k-join-anonymous table, JAT , contains PDp
tuples with no sensitive information, a challenging task
is to handle SA attributes in a manner that does not
differentiate between MT and non-MT records. The
naive solution of assigning SA values to non-MT tuples
is unacceptable for two reasons. First, there is no obvious
way to perform this assignment. Second, this increases
the perceived cardinality of SA values in the microdata,
reducing the accuracy and utility of the released data.
For instance, an analyst may mistakenly conclude that
more cancer patients exist than in reality. In the following
we present an approach that only uses the SA values
present in the microdata.
To aid the presentation, we introduce the concept of
sensitive groups. Initially, consider a k-anonymous table
AT . All tuples within a sensitive group sgi have the same
multiset of SA values, which is represented in a separate
table SI similar to Anatomy [14]. More specifically, SI
contains tuples 〈sgi, vj〉 associating SA value vj to sgi. In
addition the anonymized table includes an attribute SG
that identifies the tuple’s sensitive group. Figure 6 shows
the table AT of Figure 2(a) augmented with SG and the
corresponding SI . Tuples A, B, C, D form sg1 and are
linked to one of the {v1, v1, v2, v2} SA values. Note that
in conventional k-anonymity, unlike KJA, sensitive and
anonymized groups coincide, e.g., sg1 and g1 refer to the
same tuples.
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A
C
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g'4
k-anonymity
k- join-anonymity
Fig. 6. Sensitive information in anonymized tables
Given an AT , we can construct a KJA table JAT
with the following properties. (i) The G-box for each
anonymized group g′j of JAT is contained within the
G-box of some gi of AT , i.e., gi is a generalization of g′j .
(ii) All tuples in g′j (including those from PD
p not in
MT ) belong to the same sensitive group as those in gi,
i.e., SI is common for AT and JAT . Therefore, an MT
tuple in JAT is linked to the same SA values as in AT .
The Refinement method, described in Section 4, produces
a JAT that explicitly satisfies the first property; attaining
the second is trivial.
Figure 6 shows a JAT constructed based on the AT of
Figure 2(a). Tuples A, B, C, D, which form g1 in AT , are
split into groups g′1 and g′2 in JAT , satisfying the first
property. Furthermore, these tuples retain their associa-
tion to SA values, as they all belong to the same sensitive
group sg1, satisfying the second property. Observe that
non-MT tuples (e.g., U ) are still indistinguishable from
MT tuples (e.g., A, B). Independently of the released
table (AT or JAT ), the attacker reaches the same conclu-
sion regarding the SA value for any of the A, B, C, D
tuples, i.e., it is either v1 or v2.
3.3 Utility
To evaluate the utility of the anonymized table, we adapt
the two information loss metrics discussed in Section 2,
DM [4] and NCP [5]. Let V be an MT record and g be
its corresponding G-box in JAT . DM penalizes V based
on the number of MT records inside g. On the other
hand, NCP penalizes V by the (normalized) perimeter
of g. As an example, consider the anonymized tables AT
and JAT depicted in Figures 2(b) and 5(b). Note that in
JAT the NCP for G ∈ g′4 is 0 and the DM is 1, i.e., the
minimum possible. The total NCP for JAT is 2 · 4 + 2 ·
4 + 2 · 4 + 1 · 0 = 32, whereas for AT is 62. Similarly,
the total DM for JAT is 2 · 2 + 2 · 2 + 2 · 2 + 1 · 1 = 13
and for AT is 25. Therefore, JAT incurs less information
loss compared to AT according to DM (fewer MT tuples
per group) and NCP (smaller group perimeter). Note
that when PDp = ∅, both KJA information loss metrics
are equivalent to their counterparts for conventional k-
anonymity. Next, we show how these metrics relate to
typical mining tasks.
Consider the following aggregate query: find out the
number of MT individuals within a range of the QI
space. Figure 7 illustrates the range [0, 4] × (2, 4] as the
shaded area containing two MT tuples, C and D. Given
an anonymized table, the query can only be approxi-
mately answered. Processing for a k-anonymous table
AT proceeds as follows. The given range covers 2/3 of
g1 and 1/3 of g2. Assuming uniform distribution of MT
tuples inside the G-boxes, one can estimate that there
are approximately 2/3 · 4 = 2.66 individuals within g1
and 1/3 · 3 = 1 within g2. Therefore, based on AT , one
deduces that approximately 3.66 individuals satisfy the
query range.
On the other hand, query processing on JAT proceeds
as follows. Note that thanks to JAT ’s tighter groups
the range covers only g′2. From JAT alone, one derives
that g′2 contains three PDp tuples, but cannot discern
among MT and non-MT records. However, the SI ,
shown in Figure 6, carries additional useful information.
Tuples in g′1 and g′2 belong to sensitive group sg1, which
contains four SA values. This implies that only four MT
individuals are actually within groups g′1, g′2, and that
the remaining two are not from MT . Assuming these
four are equally distributed among g′1 and g′2, two of
them are in g′2. Therefore, based on JAT (and SI), one
concludes that approximately two individuals satisfy the
query range, which happens to be an exact estimate.
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Fig. 7. Utility of anonymized data
Analogous findings hold for more complex aggregate
queries, e.g., find the distribution of sensitive values
within a range. The correct answer for the query range
shown in Figure 7 is (v1, v2, v3) = (1, 1, 0), since C,
D have values v1, v2, respectively. Using the above
reasoning, one obtains the distribution (5/3, 5/3, 1/3)
from AT and the correct (1, 1, 0) from JAT and SI . In
conclusion, tighter G-boxes, in terms of cardinality (i.e.,
low DM) and volume (i.e., low NCP), increase the utility
of released data in typical microdata analysis scenarios.
4 KJA ALGORITHMS
KJA requires that each G-box encloses at least k tu-
ples of JT , subject to the constraint that each G-box
encloses at least one tuple of MT . kAlgorithm denotes
a generalization method for k-anonymity such as Mon-
drian or TopDown. We propose two methodologies for
applying kAlgorithm to KJA. The first, termed Direct,
generalizes the entire JT using kAlgorithm. Among the
resulting G-boxes, it keeps only the ones that represent
some record(s) in MT , and discards the rest. Note that,
depending on kAlgorithm, the remaining G-boxes may
not be tight, in which case they are replaced by their
minimum bounding boxes (MBBs).
The second methodology, called Refinement, is moti-
vated by the fact that Direct makes its first (and, thus,
more determinative) grouping decisions without taking
into account which tuples of JT appear in MT . Intu-
itively, group formation should consider the distribution
of MT records (in the QI space), and then refine them us-
ing nearby external data. Based on the above, Refinement
involves the following steps. First, it applies kAlgorithm
on MT . Then, for each generalization box created, it
performs a range query on JT and invokes kAlgorithm
on the retrieved records. This operation generates new
G-boxes. Refinement places into JAT the MBBs of the new
G-boxes that contain at least one MT tuple.
Figure 8(a) illustrates the adaptation of Mondrian to
KJA using Refinement. We use the MT dataset of Figure 3
(e.g., records A to M ), assuming that the PDp contains
tuples N to Z, shown as hollow points. First, we execute
Mondrian on MT , producing the 4 partitions shown in
Figure 3. Then, for each of these partitions, we find all
the PDp records falling inside and exploit them to refine
the groups of the first round. The bold lines correspond
to the original splits and the thinner ones to the second
round of splits. The shaded areas of Figure 8(b) denote
the final G-boxes.
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Fig. 8. KJA adaptation of Mondrian
Note that G-boxes without any MT tuple (e.g., the one
containing records T , U , V , and W ) are discarded. Also,
in groups with more external tuples than necessary, we
ignore some of them so as to minimize the corresponding
G-box perimeter; e.g., the group of L, M , Y , Z (in
Figure 8(a)) contains more than k = 3 tuples, and
omission of external record Z (in Figure 8(b)) reduces the
perimeter, without violating the anonymity constraint or
leaving any MT tuple outside. By comparing Figures 3
and 8(b)), it can be easily seen that KJA achieves a much
lower information loss. According to Direct, Mondrian is
executed on the entire JT (tuples A up to Z). During
the splitting process, if some partition contains no MT
record, it is excluded from consideration. Finally, the
MBBs of the resulting G-boxes are inserted into JAT .
Figure 9(a) exemplifies the incorporation of TopDown
in our framework according to Refinement using the MT
and PDp of Figure 8. First, we execute TopDown on MT
(the solid points), and obtain the same boxes (shown
with bold lines) as in Figure 4(b). Then, we retrieve from
JT all the records falling inside these boxes, and re-
apply TopDown on all data (solid and hollow points).
The resulting (shaded) G-boxes form JAT . Note that if
there were any boxes without MT tuples, they would
be discarded. On the other hand, in the Direct approach,
TopDown is applied on the entire JT . Figure 9(b) illus-
trates the returned G-boxes; the ones containing some
MT record (shown shaded) are placed into JAT and the
remaining ones (e.g., with external tuples N , T , and V )
are discarded.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we empirically evaluate the performance
of the KJA framework using both real and synthetic
datasets. The real dataset IPUMS [27] contains 2.8 mil-
lion records with household census information. We
form MT and PDp drawing random samples from the
original dataset. For convenience, we assume that PDp
contains all MT tuples and hence JT = PDp. The
cardinality |MT | of the MT table is fixed to 10K. The
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Fig. 9. KJA adaptation of TopDown
ratio |PDp|/|MT | varies from 1 to 100, resulting in a
PDp of 10K to 1M tuples. We extract six QI attributes
from IPUMS, and vary the dimensionality d of the QI
space from 2 up to 6, selecting the d first attributes in the
order depicted in Table 2. The anonymity requirement k
ranges between 5 and 500. The synthetic dataset, termed
UNI, has QI values uniformly distributed in [0, 1].
TABLE 2
IPUMS attributes
Attribute Domain
Age 0 – 93
Total Income 0 – 1000000
Family Size 1 – 21
Years of Education 0 –17
Rent 0 – 2500
Sex 1, 2
TABLE 3
System parameters (ranges and default values)
Parameter Default Range
Number of QI attributes (d) 4 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
|PDp|/|MT | ratio 100 1, 5, 10, 50, 100
MT cardinality 10K 10K
Anonymity Requirement (k) 50 5, 10, 50, 100, 500
Query Range Size (|R|) 10 2, 5, 10, 20, 50 (%of Domain Space)
Our experiments compare KJA versions of Mondrian
and TopDown to their conventional (i.e., k-anonymity)
counterparts in terms of information loss and processing
time. We use the modified NCP and DM metrics, defined
in Section 3.3, to quantify information loss. Further-
more, we consider data analysis scenarios involving
range-count queries: find out how many MT tuples
satisfy a given range R in the QI space. MondrianDIR
(TopDownDIR) and MondrianREF (TopDownREF) refer to
the Direct and Refinement KJA variants of Mondrian
(TopDown). In each diagram, we vary one parameter
(|PDp|/|MT |, k, d, or |R|), while setting the remaining
ones to their default values. The tested ranges and
default values for these parameters are shown in Table 3.
The reported results correspond to the average of values
obtained through 5 executions with different (random)
selections of MT and PDp records. All experiments were
performed using a 2.4 GHz Core 2 Duo CPU.
Figures 10 and 11 measure NCP and DM, respectively,
using Mondrian and the IPUMS dataset. Figures 10(a)
and 11(a) focus on the effect of |PDp|/|MT |. The in-
formation loss of conventional Mondrian is constant,
as it does not take into account PDp. On the other
hand, KJA improves as the size of PDp increases. This
is expected, since the space around the microdata be-
comes denser with PDp tuples, enabling KJA to create
smaller G-boxes (and, thus, to reduce the NCP). The DM
drops because each G-box contains more external records
on the average and, hence, fewer MT tuples. When
|PDp|/|MT | = 100, for instance, MondrianDIR has 3.04
times lower NCP than Mondrian, and 14.35 times lower
DM. In the same setting, MondrianREF reduces NCP
and DM by 2.15 and 4.96 times, respectively. Regarding
the comparison between the KJA methods, MondrianDIR
performs better than MondrianREF for both metrics. The
quality of the produced JAT is largely determined by
the initial splitting decisions of Mondrian. For a skewed
dataset, like IPUMS, having knowledge of the entire
PDp beforehand is helpful for evenly distributing PDp
tuples during splits. Thus, MondrianDIR leads to more
balanced G-boxes (in terms of size and in terms of the
ratio of microdata to external tuples) than MondrianREF.
Figures 10(b) and 11(b) plot the information loss as
function of k (|PDp|/|MT | = 100, d = 4). A stricter
anonymity requirement naturally leads to a higher infor-
mation loss for all algorithms. The G-boxes are enlarged
to cover the necessary number of tuples, leading to
higher NCP. In turn, larger G-boxes contain more MT tu-
ples, i.e., each microdata record is anonymized together
with more MT tuples on the average, incurring a higher
DM. We clarify that in Figure 11(b) the information
loss of both KJA variants does increase with k, but the
difference is not obvious because the chart contains large
DM values for Mondrian; their DM for k = 500 is around
6 times higher than for k = 5.
Figures 10(c) and 11(c) examine the effect of the
number of quasi-identifiers d on the information loss
(|PDp|/|MT | = 100, k = 50). Let us first consider NCP
in Figure 10(c). The space becomes sparser in higher
dimensions, thus necessitating larger G-boxes to cover
the required number of records. Hence, the performance
of all three methods deteriorates, in accordance with
the study of [11]. On the other hand, DM is not sen-
sitive to d because the final G-boxes of Mondrian (in its
conventional or KJA version) contain approximately the
same number of MT and PDp records regardless of d
(although the perimeter of G-boxes increases with d).
Figures 12 and 13 repeat the above set of experiments
using TopDown. Figures 12(a) and 13(a) show that the
information loss decreases fast as |PDp|/|MT | grows.
For |PDp|/|MT | = 100, TopDownDIR and TopDownREF
achieve 2.1 (2.22) and 3.51 (3.4) lower NCP (DM) than
TopDown, respectively. Unlike Mondrian (Figures 10(a)
and 11(a)), the Refinement version of TopDown outper-
forms the Direct one because TopDown’s clustering pro-
cess is more flexible than the splits of Mondrian, deal-
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ing better with the skewness of IPUMS. Figures 12(b)
and 13(b) plot the information loss for the TopDown
variants versus k. The performance of all methods dete-
riorates with k, for the reasons explained in the context
of Figures 10(b) and 11(b). The effect of the QI-space
dimensionality is shown in Figures 12(c) and 13(c). The
NCP increases with d, while DM does not follow some
particular trend. The DM fluctuations in Figure 13(c) are
more evident than for Mondrian (Figure 11(c)) because
TopDown, due to its randomized nature, is more sensitive
to the relative skewness among the QIs.
In the next set of experiments (Figures 14 and 15),
we investigate KJA’s accuracy in answering range-count
queries. Given such a query, we measure the relative
error, i.e., |actual−estimate|actual , where actual is the correct
answer and estimate is the approximate value computed
from the anonymous table. For each considered setting,
we pose 100 queries that span a given percentage |R| of
the entire domain space and report the average relative
error (ARE) incurred. We only compare the Refinement
version of Mondrian and TopDown with its conventional
counterpart, as Direct cannot handle range-count queries
(see Section 3.3). Figure 14(a) draws the ARE as function
of |PDp|/|MT | when all other parameters are set to
their default values. In this setting, Mondrian has on
average 21.1 relative error. Similar to the trends observed
in Figures 10(a), 11(a), Refinement quickly reduces this
value as more public tuples are incorporated in the
anonymization process. In particular, for the default set-
ting (|PDp|/|MT | = 100), MondrianREF produces almost
2.71 times more accurate estimates (ARE 7.7).
Figure 14(b) shows the average relative error while
varying k. As the anonymity requirement increases, the
accuracy of range-aggregate queries decreases because
G-boxes become larger. MondrianREF consistently pro-
duces tighter G-boxes as shown in Figures 10(b), 11(b)
and significantly reduces the ARE. For instance, the
reduction is 1.88-fold (ARE 2.7 vs. 5.1) when k = 5,
and becomes 3.24-fold for k = 500 (ARE 37.6 vs. 11.6).
Figure 14(c) studies the effect of the range size |R|. In
all values examined, MondrianREF provides 2 up to 4
times more accurate query answers than Mondrian. Note
that the estimation accuracy increases with |R| because
for low |R| values the range covers only a few tuples;
consequently, even small absolute discrepancies lead to
large relative errors.
Figure 15 repeats the above setup for TopDown and
shows similar trends. In the default setting TopDownREF
achieves a 1.74-fold improvement in accuracy over Top-
Down (ARE 3.5 vs. 6.1); note that both methods are more
accurate than Mondrian or MondrianREF. An interesting
observation in Figure 15(b) is that the accuracy of Top-
Down variants decreases quickly as the anonymization
requirement increases. For instance, TopDown (TopDown-
REF) has ARE 0.41 (0.18) when k = 5, but ARE 51.2 (30.8)
when k = 500. Nonetheless, in all cases KJA reduces the
average relative error with an improvement factor that
ranges from 1.66 up to 3.04.
Next, we measure the information loss using NCP
on the uniform datasets; DM charts demonstrate similar
trends and are omitted. Figures 16 and 17 investigate
the effectiveness of KJA using Mondrian and TopDown,
respectively. In general, KJA exhibits analogous behavior
to that on IPUMS, with an interesting difference. The
two KJA variants of Mondrian produce JAT s with almost
identical information loss (Figure 16). Similarly, the mar-
gin between TopDownREF and TopDownDIR (Figure 17)
is very narrow compared to IPUMS (Figure 12). The
reason for the above observations is that the uniform
distribution of the data reduces the effect of the different
grouping decisions followed by the Direct and Refinement
variants of the algorithms.
So far our empirical study has centered on the infor-
mation loss and estimation accuracy. Figures 18 and 19,
on the other hand, illustrate the processing time for Mon-
drian and TopDown, respectively, versus |PDp|/|MT |, k,
and d. As shown in Figures 18(a) and 19(a), the running
time of both KJA variants increases with |PDp|/|MT |
(since they process more PDp tuples), whereas, as ex-
pected, that of the conventional generalization tech-
niques is constant. MondrianREF is about two times
slower than MondrianDIR because it performs multiple
range queries on the external database. However, the
TopDown variants require roughly the same time. Top-
Down executes in two steps: (i) splitting, and (ii) merging
groups. The running time is dominated by the latter
step, as it requires joining multiple small groups. This
cost is similar for both TopDownDIR and TopDownREF.
Although KJA algorithms are more expensive than their
conventional counterparts, their execution time never
exceeds a few minutes, which is a reasonable cost given
that anonymization is a one-time effort.
Figures 18(b) and 19(b) vary k and measure the pro-
cessing time. The cost of all Mondrian versions decreases
with k, since fewer splits are necessary to produce
the JAT . The cost of the conventional TopDown also
decreases with k, but this is not the case for TopDown-
REF and TopDownDIR. The splitting step of TopDown is
accelerated for large k. The cost of the merging step, on
the other hand, increases with the cumulative number
of (MT and PDp) tuples inside the groups. These con-
flicting factors are responsible for the relatively stable
performance of the KJA versions of TopDown.
Figures 18(c) and 19(c) plot the running time versus d.
All Mondrian variants are unaffected by d, as the number
of performed splits is independent of d. In Figure 19(c),
the cost of the conventional TopDown increases with d,
because the NCP calculations involved in its clustering
strategy become more expensive. For the KJA variants
of TopDown this extra cost is negligible compared to the
time spent for range queries, and thus their total running
time is relatively stable.
Summarizing, compared to k-anonymity, KJA reduces
the information loss and increases the estimation accu-
racy. For uniform datasets Refinement and Direct have
similar benefits in terms of information loss. On the other
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hand, for real-life datasets, Direct seems more suitable
for Mondrian-based generalization, whereas Refinement
works better with TopDown. Refinement has higher pro-
cessing cost than Direct due to the multiple range queries
it issues.
6 CONCLUSION
In most practical anonymization scenarios there exists
public knowledge (e.g., voter registration data) that can
be used by an attacker to breach privacy. On the other
hand, this knowledge can also be exploited to reduce
the information loss in the published data. Motivated
by this observation, we introduce the concept of k-join-
anonymity (KJA) and show how existing generalization
algorithms can be adopted to take into account exter-
nal databases. We demonstrate the effectiveness of KJA
through an extensive experimental evaluation, using real
and synthetic datasets.
An interesting direction for future work is to apply
the general concept of exploiting external knowledge to
alternative forms of de-identification. For instance, since
some k-anonymity algorithms (e.g., Mondrian) can be
easily adapted to capture l-diversity, we expect that the
availability of external information will also be beneficial
in this case. Additionally, we plan to investigate the issue
of updates in MT and PD. Assume that, after the initial
release of AT , the MT is modified and a new AT must
be published. Meanwhile, the PD may have also been
updated. A challenging issue is to incrementally update
the AT , without compromising the privacy of MT or the
utility of AT .
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